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In April 2006, the Judiciary Committee of the Minnesota
1
2
Senate defeated a proposed amendment to the state constitution.

† Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. Thanks are due to my
research assistant, Elizabeth Dwyer. Appreciation is also expressed to Professor
Eileen Scallen and Philip Duran, Staff Attorney for OutFront Minnesota, for their
helpful comments and notes. Special thanks are also in order to Ann DeGroot,
Executive Director of OutFront Minnesota. Any faults or misjudgments herein are
exclusively my own.
1. H.F. 6, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005).
2. The State Senate Judiciary Committee defeated the proposal, through a
four-to-five vote, on April 4. See Tom Scheck, Committee Defeats Marriage
Amendment (Apr. 4, 2006), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/
2006/04/04/marriagehearing/.
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This amendment would have permanently affixed sexual
orientation discrimination into the text of that document. Its
proponents tried to advance it as a “marriage” amendment, but its
effects would have extended far beyond formal marriage. It would
have foreclosed the recognition of same-sex civil unions and
3
domestic partnerships as well. Most probably, it also would have
been interpreted to prohibit other civil protections for lesbian and
gay couples, such as joint health insurance benefits—especially for
public employees.
In spite of this proposal’s defeat last year, some are still trying
to keep alive the prospect of adopting such an amendment in the
4
future. This effort should be resisted. As noted above, the
amendment had much more wide-ranging effects than was
commonly realized at the time. But the obtrusively broad scope of
this amendment is only part of what makes it so pernicious. The
main issue for confrontation is the amendment’s deeply anti5
democratic nature.
Using a constitutional amendment to try to resolve a
compelling issue in political discourse is inherently antidemocratic. Any issue that is made the subject of a constitutional
amendment is thereby placed outside the sphere of democratic
decision making. If a constitutional amendment on any particular
issue is adopted, it no longer matters thereafter what either the
popular or legislative will is or may become on that issue. The
resolution of the issue is foreclosed by the permanence of the
constitutional amendment.
This deadening effect on democracy would be especially
preclusive in the field of lesbian and gay rights in Minnesota. Even
if one is not predisposed to be sympathetic to lesbian and gay
rights, one can observe clear trends in recent Minnesota legal and
political history demonstrating that lesbian and gay rights have
6
been the subject of vibrant and dynamic public discussion. The
treatment of lesbian and gay rights in this state has been very much
a subject of democratic debate and majoritarian consideration.
3. See infra Part I.
4. E.g., Teresa Stanton Collett, Constitutional Confusion: The Case for the
Minnesota Marriage Amendment, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1029 (2007).
5. See Dale Carpenter, Four Arguments Against a Marriage Amendment that Even
an Opponent of Gay Marriage Should Accept, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 71, 89 (2004)
(providing an analogous point regarding proposed amendments to the Federal
Constitution).
6. See infra Parts II, III.
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Historically, Minnesota has allowed the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual
and, Transgender (“LGBT”) community to pursue its aims in the
7
marketplace of public ideas. Sometimes the LGBT community has
8
won the democratic debate, and sometimes it has lost. But the
debate has always been open. On those occasions when the LGBT
community has lost, it has always had the option to return to the
public forum and once again press its claims in the democratic
arena. A constitutional amendment of this type would fly in the
face of this tradition and cut off legislative debate on this centrally
important issue.
The Minnesota Legislature—and its electorate—has thus been
open, to varying degrees over time, to the concerns of the LGBT
9
community. The same is really not quite as true concerning the
10
most significant actions of the Minnesota courts. In general, the
most cogent actions of the more senior and influential Minnesota
courts in recent years have demonstrated a notable coolness to the
11
interests of the LGBT community. The one definitive state court
ruling that sided wholly with the state’s LGBT community was
12
issued by a mere county trial court, had limited direct effects, and
13
In
was, in any event, quickly superseded by federal case law.
general, our state courts have been notably slow to come to the aid
14
of the LGBT community outside the legislative process.
Accordingly, there is no good reason to suppose that any
action would be forthcoming from Minnesota courts to judicially
alter the majoritarian character of the debate. The potential for
court action therefore presents no adequate basis for a
constitutional amendment in this area.
But even if Minnesota courts (contrary to past behavior) were
to become more actively in favor of the LGBT community in this
area—and even if concern over this trend encouraged a
constitutional amendment—any amendment could serve its aims
just as effectively after any such judicial determination as before it.
The eagerness of some activists to rush to amendment—even
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part III.
12. Doe v. Ventura, No. MC 01-489, 2001 WL 543734 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 15,
2001); see infra Part III.D.
13. See infra Part III.D.
14. See infra Part III.
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before any state court has given any credible indication of an
expansionary trend in this area—betrays those advocates’ distrust
for the democratic process.
Furthermore, the text of the specific amendment that prodiscrimination activists are advancing is so broad that their real aim
cannot be consistent with the protection of legislative democracy.
Rather, the extreme breadth of their proposal strongly indicates a
disdain—rather than a respect—for the democratic process.
In summary, respect for legislative democracy—quite apart
from any preconceived notions about the value of same-sex
relationships—requires the rejection of any constitutional
amendment intended to discriminate against such relationships.
I.

THE BROAD SCOPE OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

Before proceeding further with discussions concerning the
proposed amendment, it is appropriate to briefly examine its text
and comment on its extreme breadth. It is phrased so broadly that
it almost certainly precludes same-sex civil unions, as well as formal
marriages. And it might also prevent certain private arrangements,
such as employer-provided health insurance for the same-sex
partners of employees. The sheer breadth of the proposal is in
itself a strong reason for disapproving it. The proposed language
reads as follows:
“Only the union of one man and one woman shall be
valid or recognized as a marriage in Minnesota. Any other
relationship shall not be recognized as a marriage or its
15
legal equivalent.”
The remarkable breadth of the language emanates chiefly
from its second sentence, which declares that “[a]ny other
relationship shall not be recognized” as the “legal equivalent” of
16
marriage. One of the primary characteristics of civil unions—as
17
they have developed in states such as Vermont
and
18
Connecticut —is precisely that they are the exact equivalent, in
19
terms of statutory rights and responsibilities, of formal marriage.
15. S.F. 1691, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005) (containing the language of
the most recent bill). Professor Collett cites identical language in an earlier bill.
Collett, supra note 4, at 1048.
16. Minn. S.F. 1691.
17. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201–07 (2002 & Supp. 2006).
18. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-38aa to 46b-38pp (Supp. 2006).
19. Indeed, one aspect of the opinion of the Vermont Supreme Court in
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Their appeal and acceptability to many gay-rights activists lies
principally in this equivalence.
The proposal declares that no relationship, other than
between a man and a woman, can be the “legal equivalent” of
20
marriage. By its terms, this language would seem to preclude a
civil-union regime in which the partners to a civil union receive the
equivalent rights and undertake the equivalent obligations of
marriage.
The probable effects of this language extend far beyond the
disavowal of civil unions and domestic partnerships. Several courts
around the country have already interpreted language such as this
in recently adopted state constitutional amendments. Many have
interpreted these provisions to prohibit virtually any type of
recognition of same-sex couples for any governmental purpose.
The most recent example is a ruling from the Michigan Court
of Appeals holding that Michigan’s amendment—broadly similar to
the Minnesota proposal—precludes any grant of same-sex domestic
partner benefits to any employees of the state or its governmental
21
subdivisions. An example from last year is from an Ohio appellate
court holding that Ohio’s constitutional amendment prevented
that state’s domestic violence statute from protecting unmarried
22
couples—even those in different-sex relationships. Each of the
state constitutional amendments varies from the others at least
23
slightly in some particulars, and other courts have reached
Baker v. State was that civil unions would be an acceptable mode of relief under the
court’s decision only to the extent that civil unions provided for the same rights
and responsibilities as formal marriage. 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999).
20. Minn. S.F. 1691.
21. Nat’l Pride at Work v. Michigan, No. 265870, 2007 WL 313582 (Mich. Ct.
App. Feb. 1, 2007). The Michigan amendment reads as follows: “‘To secure and
preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future generations of
children, the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only
agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.’” Id. at *1
n.2 (quoting MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 25). The court of appeals reversed the trial
court. Id. at *1.
22. State v. Ward, 849 N.E.2d 1076, 1082 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). Contra State
v. Burk, 843 N.E.2d 1254 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
23. The Ohio amendment reads as follows:
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid
in or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions. This state and
its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for
relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the
design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.
OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; see also Burk, 843 N.E.2d at 1255 (quoting OHIO CONST.
art. XV, § 11).
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24

different conclusions. But there is no shortage of examples for
the very broad application of these kinds of amendments.
Furthermore, the Minnesota proposal language goes on to
suggest that it may prohibit private arrangements that provide
25
marriage-like considerations for same-sex couples or families.
The proposal states that “[a]ny other relationship shall not be
26
recognized as a marriage or its legal equivalent.” The language
does not say that the State of Minnesota shall not recognize such a
relationship; rather, it says that no such relationship shall “be”
27
recognized.
The State of Minnesota is not stated as the party
whose recognition is precluded, but instead the broader phrase—
28
using the word “be”—is deployed.
The inference is entirely
plausible, even reasonable, that no one in the state having the
capacity through contractual means (or any other means) shall
29
recognize an alternative relationship as a marital equivalent.
This could apply in a broad variety of contexts: from those as
relatively minor as “family” gym club memberships to those as
major as “family” coverage or “domestic partner” coverage in
employee health benefit programs. Clearly the gym clubs and
employee benefit plans are in some sense “recognizing” the samesex relationships in these contexts as something approximating a
marital relation. It would be open to a reviewing court to interpret

24. E.g., Nat’l Pride at Work v. Granholm, No. 05-368-CZ, 2005 WL 3048040,
at *7 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2005) (holding that Michigan’s constitutional
amendment did not preclude public employers from recognizing same-sex
domestic partners for purposes of providing medical insurance benefits), rev’d sub
nom. Nat’l Pride at Work v. Michigan, No. 265870, 2007 WL 313582 (Mich. Ct.
App. Feb. 1, 2007); Burk, 843 N.E.2d at 1258 (holding “that Ohio’s domestic
violence statute, insofar as it defines ‘family or household member’ to include
unmarried individuals who live as spouses, is constitutional and coexists in
harmony” with Ohio’s constitutional amendment).
25. See S.F. 1691, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005).
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. See id. The inference is all the more foreseeable since an alternative bill
was introduced at broadly the same time as the language favored by Professor
Collett. See Collett, supra note 4, at 1048. The language of that alternative bill
indeed limited its effect to non-recognition “by the state or any of its subdivisions.”
H.F. 6, 2d Engrossment, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005). Assuming the
language favored by Professor Collett was adopted as an amendment, a reviewing
court could easily draw the conclusion that—since the language is broader than
the earlier version limited to the state government for its effects—the broader
language in the amendment should not be so limited in the way that the earlier
(unadopted) language was limited.
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the proposed constitutional language to preclude these private
relationships, as well as government sanctions.
II. LGBT RIGHTS IN MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The history of legislation concerning Minnesota’s LGBT
community presents a varying pattern of victories and defeats over
time. The first advances for the community were recorded at the
level of municipal legislation in the state’s two largest cities. The
history of these municipal legislative efforts was somewhat
tumultuous in St. Paul—at least in the early years—but has been
somewhat less eventful in Minneapolis.
A. The Minneapolis and St. Paul Human Rights Ordinances
The Minneapolis Civil Rights ordinance was amended in 1974
to include protection on the basis of “affectional or sexual
30
preference.”
At that time, the ordinance prohibited
discrimination in employment, labor relations, real property
transactions, public accommodations, public services, and
31
banking. Protected categories that had previously been included
were race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, national origin, and
32
sex. The addition of a sexual orientation category to a civil rights
33
ordinance was a substantially progressive act in 1974. Since this
amendment took effect, there has been little agitation for any
alteration to its text or effects.
In St. Paul, the legislative situation has been somewhat more
lively over the years. The City of St. Paul had an anti-discrimination
34
ordinance in place as early as 1956. At that time, the subject area
35
chiefly covered was employment discrimination.
The
classifications initially protected were race, color, religious creed,

30. Minneapolis, Minn., Ordinance 99-68 (1974) (amending MINNEAPOLIS,
MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 945 (relating to Civil Rights)).
31. Id. § 3.
32. Id. §§ 1–4.
33. The amendment defined “affectional or sexual preference” as “having or
manifesting an emotional or physical attachment to another consenting person or
persons, or having or manifesting a preference for such attachment.” Id. § 2.
34. ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 74.01 (1956).
35. E.g., id. § 74.01(2) (providing that “discrimination in employment tends
unjustly to subject groups of inhabitants of any city to depressed living conditions
thereby causing injury to the public safety, general welfare, and good order of any
city and endangers the public health thereof”).
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36

national origin, and ancestry. The City Council amended the law
in 1974, adding “affectional preference” to the list of protected
37
classifications. This generally corresponded in time and effect to
the amendment in Minneapolis.
The St. Paul amendment was not met with universal
38
enthusiasm by the political community. During the late 1970s,
the singer Anita Bryant was leading a national campaign to oppose
39
Her campaign used the
the nascent gay rights movement.
40
moniker, “Save Our Children.”
Largely as a result of this
campaign’s efforts in St. Paul, a popular referendum repealed the
41
1974 “affectional preference” amendment in 1978.
The issue was reawakened in 1990 when the City Council once
again added “sexual or affectional orientation” to the list of
42
protected classes in the ordinance.
This time, the definition
employed in the St. Paul ordinance was noteworthy. During this
period, the phrase “sexual orientation” was generally considered to
apply to affective orientation, and, accordingly, to comprise
homosexual, heterosexual, or bisexual orientation. State statutes in
effect at this time were broadly consistent with this view of the
43
meaning of “sexual orientation.”
The St. Paul ordinance took the definitional step of
44
attempting to include transgender persons as well. The definition
included not only homosexuality, heterosexuality, and bisexuality,
but also “having or being perceived as having a self-image or
identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness
45
or one’s biological femaleness.”
This was one of the earliest
legislative efforts to specifically include transgender persons in civil
rights protections based on sexual orientation.
Then, in 1991, anti-gay activists again agitated for repeal of the
36. Id. § 74.01(1).
37. Telephone Interview by Elizabeth Dwyer with Ann DeGroot, Executive
Director, OutFront Minnesota, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Feb. 15, 2007).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 183.01 (1990).
43. For example, the 1993 version of the Wisconsin state anti-discrimination
law defined “sexual orientation” as “having a preference for heterosexuality,
homosexuality, or bisexuality, having a history of such a preference or being
identified with such a preference.” WIS. STAT. § 111.32(13)(m) (1993).
44. See ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE, § 183.02(26).
45. See id.
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civil rights protections for LGBT persons—again using the
46
mechanism of a popular initiative. In response, activists of the
47
LGBT community organized a vibrant “No Repeal” campaign.
48
This “No Repeal” campaign was successful, and the coverage of
sexual orientation—with its relatively comprehensive definition—
49
has remained undisturbed in the St. Paul ordinance ever since.
B. The Minnesota Hate Crime Statute
The Minnesota legislature enacted a comprehensive hate
50
This was a statute of the sentencecrime statute in 1989.
enhancement variety that provided for enhanced punishment of
those convicted defendants who had perpetrated certain violent
crimes “because of” the particular societal group(s) to which the
51
victims belonged.
The passage of this statute was
contemporaneous with an active national movement in almost all
52
states to pass sentence-enhancement statutes of this kind.
Not all of these state statutes contained express protections for
members of the LGBT community, and some still do not. The
Minnesota statute, however, has expressly included “sexual
orientation” in its list of protected classifications from its
53
inception.
Accordingly, in the adoption of the state’s first comprehensive
sentence-enhancement hate crime statute, the legislature
demonstrated its interest in helping to secure the personal safety of
members of the state’s LGBT community. There has never been
any serious effort to amend or repeal the hate-crime protections of

46. Jim Ragsdale, Gay-Rights Issue May Be Decided by Voter Turnout, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Nov. 1, 1991, at 1A.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE, § 183.02(26).
50. Act of May 25, 1989, ch. 261, 1989 Minn. Laws 892.
51. Id.
52. See generally Anthony S. Winer, Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and the
Constitution, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 387, 419–27 (1994) (providing a
background on the general movement to enact hate crime statutes in the late
twentieth century).
53. The current hate crimes act is codified at a variety of statutory sections.
E.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.595, subdivs. 1a, 2, 3 (2006) (criminal damage to property
in the second-, third-, and fourth-degrees); § 609.749, subdiv. 3 (aggravated
violations of harassment and stalking); § 609.2231, subdiv. 4 (assaults motivated by
bias); § 626.5531 (reporting of crimes motivated by bias). Each of these sections
includes “sexual orientation” as a protected classification.
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this statute for LGBT Minnesotans.
C. The Minnesota Civil Rights Act
Minnesota adopted the predecessor of its current Civil Rights
54
Statute in 1967. The law in force at that time prohibited
discrimination in employment, housing and real property, public
55
accommodations, public services, and education on the basis of
56
race, color, creed, religion, or national origin. Over the years, the
categories of people protected from discrimination increased. The
current categories are: race, color, creed, religion, national origin,
sex, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, disability,
57
sexual orientation, or age.
The legislature added sexual orientation as a protected
58
classification in 1993.
This legislative change substantially
improved the legal position of LGBT people in the state, because
for the first time they were legally protected statewide from being
59
fired, evicted, or refused business based on their LGBT status.
There was opposition to this legislation while the legislature was
considering it. Indeed, the proponents of the legislation were
required to include—as part of the statutory modification—
assurances that the inclusion of sexual orientation did not express
approval of homosexuality, bisexuality, or any equivalent lifestyle;
did not authorize affirmative action with respect to “homosexuality
60
or bisexuality;” and did not authorize same-sex marriage.
Thus, although many LGBT people justly viewed the passage
of statewide-civil-rights protections as a victory, the victory was
acquired at some cost. The popular uneasiness at the time with the
issue of sexual orientation caused the legislature to insert
additional language that many might feel to be irrelevant and
disrespectful. But in the give-and-take of legislative debate, this was
the text of the law that the legislature ultimately adopted.

54. Act of May 25, 1967, ch. 897, 1967 Minn. Laws 1932.
55. Id. §§ 10 (housing), 11 (education), 12 (employment), 13 (real property),
14 (public accommodations), 15 (public services), 16 (educational institution).
56. E.g., id. § 13.
57. MINN. STAT. § 363A.08.
58. Act of April 2, 1993, ch. 22, § 19, 1993 Minn. Laws 142.
59. See generally id. ch. 22, 1993 Minn. Laws 121.
60. Id. § 7, 1993 Minn. Laws 126 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 363A.27 (2006)).
Cf. MINN. STAT. § 609.293, subdiv. 5 (2006) (criminal prohibition of sodomy),
invalidated by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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D. The Minnesota State DOMA
Another enactment by the state legislature during the 1990s
was more uniformly negative for the LGBT community. In 1997,
the legislature passed the state’s so-called “Defense of Marriage
61
Act” (“DOMA”).
This was also part of a national trend that
followed closely upon the 1993 decision of the Hawaii Supreme
62
Court in Baehr v. Lewin.
In Baehr, the state supreme court held that Hawaii’s ban on
same-sex marriage discriminated on the basis of sex, and therefore
needed to satisfy strict scrutiny in order to withstand attack under
63
the equal rights amendment contained in that state’s constitution.
This first Baehr opinion thus did not definitively require the state to
recognize same-sex marriages, but only required the state to
demonstrate on remand that the exclusion of same-sex couples
64
satisfied strict scrutiny.
Nevertheless, the shock waves felt
throughout the country were enough to set off a wave of state
65
“Defense of Marriage Acts” in the next few years.
The Minnesota DOMA actually amended a variety of statutes.
The law’s most central provisions added to the list of prohibited
66
marriages “a marriage between persons of the same sex,” and then
added this language to the statutory section listing the types of
prohibited marriages:
“A marriage entered into by persons of the same sex, either
under common law or statute, that is recognized by another
state or foreign jurisdiction is void in this state and
contractual rights granted by virtue of the marriage or its
67
termination are unenforceable in this state.”

61. Act of June 2, 1997, art. 10, 1997 Minn. Laws 1857 (codified at MINN.
STAT. §§ 517.01, .03, .08, .20 (2006)).
62. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
63. Id. at 63–68.
64. Id. at 68 (“On remand, in accordance with the ‘strict scrutiny’ standard,
the burden will rest on Lewin to overcome the presumption that [the same-sex
marriage exclusion] is unconstitutional by demonstrating that it furthers
compelling state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgements of constitutional rights.”).
65. Charles E. Mauney, Jr., Landmark Decision or Limited Precedent: Does
Lawrence v. Texas Require Recognition of a Fundamental Right to Same-Sex Marriage?,
35 CUMB. L. REV. 147, 153 n.27 (2005) (listing “[s]tates with statutes or state
constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage”).
66. MINN. STAT. § 517.03, subdiv. 1(a)(4) (2006).
67. Id. § 517.03, subdiv. 1(b).
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This DOMA—which is still in force among the Minnesota
statutes today—is of course a purely statutory prohibition, rather
than a constitutional one. It is completely appropriate that, if
Minnesota is to have a law restricting same-sex marriage, it take the
form of a statute rather than a constitutional amendment. Given
the fluidity of Minnesota legislative activity on the position of LGBT
people in society, it is appropriate that the popular opinion not be
fettered in this area by a constitutional prohibition.
E. Health Care Benefits Under the Minneapolis Domestic Partner
Ordinance
In 1993, the Minneapolis City Council adopted two distinct
resolutions that had the combined effect of making health
insurance more available to domestic partners of city employees.
The first authorized “limited reimbursement to city employees for
68
health care insurance costs for same sex domestic partners,” while
the second extended “health care coverage for the partners of
69
employees in same-sex domestic partnerships.” These “domestic
partner” resolutions were intended to provide the domestic
partners of city employees with benefits more comparable to those
received by the married spouses of similarly situated city employees.
These Minneapolis City Council resolutions were invalidated
in two successive state court rulings. First—in an opinion notable
70
for its hostility to lesbian and gay perspectives —the state district
71
court determined that the two resolutions were ultra vires. Next,

68. See Lilly v. Minneapolis (Lilly II), 527 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (describing Res. 93R-106, Minneapolis City Council (Minn. April 2, 1993)
(enacted)).
69. City Council Res. 93R-342, Minneapolis, Minn. (August 27, 1993), quoted
in Lilly II, 527 N.W.2d at 109.
70. For example, as one of its purported “conclusions of law,” the district
court stated that
[h]omosexual marriage is an oxymoron since homosexuals are defined
as those ‘whose desire for sexual relations is directed to a person of the
same sex,’ and marriage is defined as the union of ‘one man and one
woman . . . whose association is founded on the distinction of sex.’
Lilly v. Minneapolis (Lilly I), No. MC 93-21375, 1994 WL 315620, at *4 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. June 3, 1994). As an additional “conclusion of law,” the district court offered
the view that “[r]edefining family relationships is not a proper subject for
municipal regulation.” Id. Although both of these quotations were based in prior
Minnesota court opinions, they remain expressions of judicial opinion, rather
than objective fact.
71. Lilly I, 1994 WL 315620, at *6.
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72

this opinion was affirmed by the state court of appeals in language
that was somewhat more moderate, but no more receptive to
73
lesbian and gay concerns.
F.

Overview of the Recent History of Legislation in Minnesota

This brief overview of the recent history of legislation in
Minnesota demonstrates that the status of the LGBT community
has been continually a subject of legislative consideration and
deliberation. It has been incremental and dynamic.
It has been incremental in two senses. First, it has been
incremental because it has proceeded from one locality to the next,
rather than becoming effective in all localities at once.
Minneapolis adopted its LGBT-protective civil rights ordinance in
74
1974.
After one legislative false start, Saint Paul effectively
amended its human rights ordinance sixteen years later in 1990.
Then three years later, the State of Minnesota amended its Human
Rights Act to include anti-discrimination protection on the basis of
75
sexual orientation. This occurred in a step-by-step fashion over a
period of years, rather than in one instance throughout the state.
It has also been incremental because it proceeded from one
subject matter to the next—rather than applying to all areas
affecting LGBT people at the same time. There are various
respects in which state laws impact LGBT people. In Minnesota,
each of these contexts has been addressed separately over time,
rather than all of them simultaneously. The earliest of these
actions was the Minneapolis LGBT-inclusive civil rights ordinance
76
in 1974. Then the Minnesota Legislature adopted its hate crime
statute in 1989, which included sexual orientation as a protected
77
category from its inception. Marriage for same-sex couples was
78
statutorily foreclosed in 1989 with the Minnesota DOMA, and in
72. Lilly II, 527 N.W.2d at 108.
73. The insistence by the court of appeals in its opinion that sexual
orientation discrimination is a “statewide problem,” coupled with the court’s
interpretation of a statute in such a way as to assure that the problem remains
unaddressed, may be narrowly defensible as a matter of judicial strategy, but could
hardly be said to be responsive to the issue of discrimination itself. See id. at 108
(referencing a statewide problem).
74. See supra Part II.A.
75. See supra note 58.
76. See supra notes 30–33.
77. See supra note 50.
78. See supra notes 61, 66–67.
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1993, the Minneapolis City Council attempted to provide health
79
These events
care benefits for Minneapolis domestic partners.
demonstrate a step-by-step pattern of legislative enactment, rather
than an all-at-once approach.
It has also been dynamic in the very evident sense that the
resulting policies have varied greatly in their perceived effects on
the LGBT community. Some of these legislative actions, such as
the early city civil-rights protections and the state hate-crime
statute, have been positive. Others, such as the state DOMA, have
been more completely negative. The members of the Minnesota
LGBT community have needed to withstand a significant number
of “highs” and “lows” over the years at the hands of the state and
local legislatures.
But in almost every case of legislation specifically addressing
80
the LGBT community, it has been the will of the relevant
legislature that has prevailed. With an amendment to the state
constitution permanently prohibiting recognition of same-sex
unions, the opponents of the LGBT community on this issue would
be making an “end run” around the democratic process. This
would be unfair to the LGBT community, which in the past has
always been required to run the legislative gauntlet of popular
opinion. Now—to the extent that the LGBT community may
actually in the future convince the legislature that same-sex civil
unions, domestic partnerships, or even marriage would be
advisable or appropriate—opponents would be removing the
democratic mechanism from the LGBT community’s reach just as
it may serve to benefit them.
III. THE RECORD OF LGBT RIGHTS LITIGATION IN MINNESOTA
COURTS
The record of major cases decided by Minnesota state courts in
the field of LGBT rights is by no means one-sided or partisan in
favor of advancing the LGBT cause. Indeed, over the years, in
several major cases specifically touching on LGBT status issues,
Minnesota courts have been notably cool to the expansion of LGBT
protections. It is accordingly unwarranted to assume that state

79. See supra notes 68–69.
80. The exception would be the result in the Lilly cases, in which the lower
court invalidated key provisions of the Minneapolis domestic partners ordinance.
See supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text.

10. WINER - RC.DOC

2007]

4/10/2007 1:03:32 PM

MARRIAGE DISCRIMINATION AMENDMENT

1073

courts will rush to mandate same-sex marriage.
A. Baker v. Nelson
81

As is frequently noted, Minnesota was one of the first
jurisdictions whose courts addressed issues of same-sex marriage.
In the 1971 case of Baker v. Nelson, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the statutory exclusion of same-sex couples from
82
marrying did not violate the U.S. Constitution.
In this decision, the Minnesota high court was not the least bit
receptive to the concept of same-sex marriage. First, the court held
that Minnesota state marriage statutes—which used arguably
gender-neutral language, at least in places—nevertheless did not
83
authorize marriage between persons of the same sex. Second, in
holding that the Federal Constitution did not require a different
84
arrangement, the court was unequivocal.
The unanimous
opinion recognized the petitioners’ arguments based on such
85
broad U.S. Supreme Court precedents as Loving v. Virginia and
86
Griswold v. Connecticut, but narrowly construed these to support
constitutional protection only for marital couples comprising one
87
man and one woman.
Although the Baker opinion is over thirty-five years old, it is still
the law in Minnesota, and has never been seriously questioned by
the state supreme court. The continued applicability of the rule in
Baker seems, at the very least, inconsistent with an alarmist assertion
81. For example, Professor Collett makes this reference in her article. See
Collett, supra note 4, at 1039.
82. 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971). The other major state court case
of the era was from Washington state. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct.
App.), appeal denied, 84 Wash.2d 1008 (1974). The holding in Singer was broadly to
the same effect.
83. Baker, 291 Minn. at 312, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
84. Id. at 315, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
85. 388 U.S. 1 (1967), cited in Baker, 291 Minn. at 314, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
86. 381 U.S. 479 (1965), cited in Baker, 291 Minn. at 313, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
87. For example, the Baker opinion correctly cites the majority opinion in
Griswold for Justice Douglas’s observation that the statute at issue in that case
“operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife.” Baker, 291 Minn.
at 313, 191 N.W.2d at 186 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482). But the Baker court
also went on to cite additional language in Griswold of potentially broader scope,
without acknowledging its potential applicability (“[T]he very idea of [the Griswold
statute’s] enforcement by police search of ‘the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives . . . is repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.’”) Id. (quoting Griswold,
381 U.S. at 485).
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that the Minnesota judiciary is poised to impose a constitutional
requirement of same-sex marriage availability.
B. The Lilly Cases
88

As noted earlier in this essay, the Minneapolis City Council in
1993 attempted to provide certain health benefits for the same-sex
domestic partners of its employees. Both the state district court
and the court of appeals ruled against Minneapolis and invalidated
89
the benefits.
The argument advanced by the plaintiff in the cases concerned
a Minnesota statute that limited the ability of cities to pay health
90
benefits to the family members of their employees. The statute
only permitted benefits to spouses, minor unmarried children, and
91
dependent students under age twenty-five. Both the state district
92
93
court and the court of appeals accordingly held that the city’s
action in paying benefits to family members other than those
specified in the statute was invalid under the statute.
But as the dissenting judge in the court of appeals decision
pointed out, the status of Minneapolis as a home rule charter city
(as opposed to a statutory city) made it eminently arguable that the
94
authorization statute did not apply. To meet this point, the court
of appeals determined that Minneapolis’ decision on how to
compensate its own employees was not a “matter of municipal
95
concern,” but rather a “statewide problem.”
Given that
determination, the court of appeals then relied on Minnesota
88. See supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 68 and 71.
90. MINN. STAT. § 471.61, subdiv. 1 (2006); cited in Lilly I, passim; quoted in Lilly
II, 527 N.W.2d at 110.
91. MINN. STAT. § 471.61, subdivs. 1, 1a.
92. Lilly v. Minneapolis (Lilly I), No. MC 93-21375, 1994 WL 315620, at *5
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Minn. June 3, 1994) (“Defendant’s Council’s Resolutions 93R-106
and 93R-342 provide insurance benefits to persons not authorized to receive
benefits by [Minnesota Statute section] 471.61.”).
93. Lilly v. Minneapolis (Lilly II), 527 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
(“The City of Minneapolis cannot expand the statute with respect to persons who
may receive medical benefits and premiums paid at the request of a city employee
when the legislature by clear definition has made the subject matter one of
statewide concern and has defined who may receive such benefits.”).
94. Id. at 114 (Schumacher, J., dissenting) (“There is no basis to conclude
that the legislature intended to preempt a home rule charter city’s power to
provide compensation to its employees in the form of taxable healthcare
benefits.”).
95. Id. at 111 (majority opinion).
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Supreme Court authority to the effect that if local legislation
“involve[s] a statewide problem,” courts should “narrowly construe”
96
the local legislature’s power to enact the legislation.
It probably suffices to note that a city’s decision about its own
compensation of its own employees, paid for by its own residents,
97
will seem to many to be a “matter of municipal concern.” It will
also seem to many that a municipal decision to provide health
benefits to employees’ families, for which the city’s own taxpayers
are more than willing to pay, can be viewed as not being a
“statewide problem” at all. Indeed, many might assert that it is not
a problem of any kind—but rather simply a local determination of
appropriate compensation to local officials.
In any event, whichever interpretation one believes is more
reasonable, the point still remains that the Lilly decisions provide
no support at all for the assertion that Minnesota courts are poised
to strike down the same-sex marriage exclusion. Quite to the
contrary, the indications are largely that there is no basis for such
an expectation.
C. The Goins Cases
Another example concerns the pair of decisions issued by the
Minnesota appellate courts in 2000 and 2001 regarding the
employment discrimination claims of a male-to-female transgender
98
employee at a major Minnesota-based publishing company.
The Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) is one of the few
in the United States that is designed to prohibit discrimination on
99
the basis of transgender identity. But the language the MHRA
technically uses to describe transgender status is somewhat
awkward and ambiguous. The element of the definition of the
term “transgender” in the MHRA that corresponds to transgender
status is that portion of the definition providing that “sexual
96. Id. (citing Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. 1984) in
stating that “[m]ost significantly . . . if the local legislation involves a statewide
problem, we must apply the supreme court’s most recent directive to ‘narrowly
construe’ the city’s power to act ‘unless the legislature has expressly provided
otherwise.’”).
97. See id. at 111.
98. Goins v. West Group (Goins II), 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001); Goins v.
West Group (Goins I), 619 N.W.2d 424 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
99. See supra note 44 (concerning St. Paul’s city ordinance which includes
transgender identity). The Minnesota state statute’s language, referenced in the
following text, is similar.
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orientation” includes “having or being perceived as having a selfimage or identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological
100
maleness or femaleness.”
In these cases, the employee had wanted to use the female
101
But the employer
restroom that was nearest to her workspace.
instead required the employee to use one of two single-occupancy
102
restrooms at more remote locations. In this type of situation, the
language of the statute can be treated in a number of different
ways. For example, the employee—whose self-image is female but
whose external morphology may be male—is being treated
differently from employees whose self-image is female but whose
biological morphology is also female. On this construction, the
employer’s behavior could be seen as discriminatory. This was in
line with the perspective adopted by the Minnesota Court of
103
Appeals.
On the other hand, the employer could simply be said to be
assigning the male restroom for all employees with male external
genital morphology and the female restroom to all employees with
female external genital morphology. This is more in line with the
104
The supreme
perspective adopted by the state supreme court.
court’s approach, in order to be credible, must be viewed with a
willingness in mind to discount or even ignore an employee’s
transgender status. This approach treats a non-operative, male-tofemale transgender person as though the person were male for all
relevant purposes; it treats the transgender female as though she
were essentially male.
The supreme court’s choice to do this could hardly be said to
evince respect or solicitude for members of the transgender or
LGBT communities. This opinion by the Minnesota Supreme
Court was ultimately authoritative, and (for better or worse)
remains the law in Minnesota today. Like Baker before it, this
example of judicial action provides no basis for discerning a

100. MINN. STAT. § 363A.03, subdiv. 44 (2006).
101. Goins II, 635 N.W.2d at 721.
102. Id.
103. Goins I, 619 N.W.2d at 429 (“Goins has made a prima facie case of direct
discrimination under the MHRA by showing that she was denied the use of a
workplace facility based on the inconsistency between her self-image and her
anatomy.”).
104. Goins II, 635 N.W.2d at 723 (“[T]he traditional and accepted practice in
the employment setting is to provide restroom facilities that reflect the cultural
preference for restroom designation based on biological gender.”).
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Minnesota judiciary that is predisposed to rule in favor of LGBT
claims of discrimination.
D. Doe v. Ventura
In 2001, the District Court for the Fourth Judicial District in
Hennepin County invalidated Minnesota’s criminal sodomy statute
as a violation of the right to privacy guaranteed by the Minnesota
105
The decision was a victory for the state’s LGBT
Constitution.
community, but the circumstances of its issuance counseled
restraint in the community’s satisfaction. The State did not appeal
the district court’s ruling to the court of appeals, so it remained a
somewhat less prominent trial court decision. It was, for example,
not docketed for official publication, and remains available chiefly
through commercial electronic databases. There was accordingly
no statewide declaration of invalidity on the merits of the case.
Two short years later, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
106
Lawrence v. Texas, which invalidated all state laws of this type
throughout the country under the Due Process Clause of the
Federal Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment. This, for better or
worse, probably had the effect of eclipsing the Doe decision in
Minnesota. The issue is now resolved at the federal level, under the
107
Therefore, the situation currently in
Federal Constitution.
Minnesota—in which the state criminal sodomy law cannot be
enforced in any part of the state—is more prominently the result of
federal activity than state judicial action.
The district court’s action in Doe was both welcomed and
appreciated by the state’s LGBT community at the time it was
issued. But it cannot be taken as an indication of a general
tendency on the part of Minnesota judges to make broad rulings
expanding LGBT rights.
IV. THE FORM OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON
DEMOCRACY
This essay has demonstrated that the proposed constitutional

105. Doe v. Ventura, No. MC 01-489, 2001 WL 543734, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
May 15, 2001).
106. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
107. Id. Lawrence struck down as unconstitutional “a Texas statute making it a
crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual
conduct.” Id. at 562.
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amendment would have very wide-ranging consequences, and that
these would have a profoundly anti-democratic effect on the public
consideration of LGBT rights. It has also shown that this antidemocratic move is especially unjustified, given the historically
unsympathetic character of the state judiciary’s treatment of LGBT
108
causes.
But this proposed amendment is anti-democratic in a further
respect as well. As already shown earlier in this essay, the
mechanism of a constitutional amendment in this context is
inherently anti-democratic because it cuts off the legislative process
in this area. And this particular proposal is drafted in such a way
that the anti-democratic effects are especially firmly assured. Not
only is the mechanism of the amendment anti-democratic, but its
very language seems calculated to maximize its anti-democratic
effects.
As noted earlier, what appears to be the most authoritative text
of the proposed amendment reads as follows:
“Only the union of one man and one woman shall be
valid or recognized as a marriage in Minnesota. Any other
relationship shall not be recognized as a marriage or its
109
legal equivalent.”
This language takes the form of an affirmative prohibition of
legislative activity. Even if the state legislature at some later point
determines that it wants to authorize civil unions, or domestic
partnerships, or same-sex marriage, this amendment antidemocratically forecloses that possibility—contrary to the theneffective legislative will.
Another linguistic formulation would avoid this sharply
preclusive effect. An alternative version of such an amendment
could read as follows:
No provision of this Constitution shall be interpreted by
any court to require that marriage be applicable to any
relationship other than that between one man and one
woman.
This language would foreclose the possibility that judges could
interpret the state constitution to require that marriage be available
to same-sex couples. On the other hand, it would still preserve the
potential that a future state legislature could enact same-sex

108.
109.

See supra Part III.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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marriage, civil unions, or domestic partnerships. Since this
amendment would work by restricting the interpretive discretion of
judges, it could be described as using an “interpretational
approach” to the issue.
The most active proponents of a constitutional amendment in
Minnesota have not used an interpretational approach, instead
opting for an affirmative prohibition, as shown by the first-quoted
110
language above.
The interpretational approach is well known in constitutional
discourse.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States
111
Constitution is phrased using the interpretational approach.
Even one of the final versions of the unsuccessful federal
constitutional amendment partially used the interpretational
112
approach.
LGBT activists would still generally be opposed to an
amendment using the interpretational approach, since it still
implicitly devalues LGBT relationships. But it at least has the virtue
of not foreclosing the democratic process and potentially
frustrating the will of future legislatures.
But the Minnesota anti-LGBT activists have not opted for this
110. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
111. The Eleventh Amendment reads as follows: “The judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens of Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
In this provision, the “shall not be construed” language is the key phrase that, as
written at least, determines the way in which the Eleventh Amendment was
designed to work. It also uses an interpretational approach, because the limitation
on “construing” the power of the United States is a limitation on the interpretive
discretion of judges.
112. The so-called “Federal Marriage Amendment” was rejected by the Senate,
by a vote of forty-nine to forty-eight, on June 6, 2006. 152 CONG. REC. S5441-42
(daily ed. June 6, 2006). The text of that amendment reads as follows:
“Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man
and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any
state, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents
thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and
a woman.”
S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 8, 2004). Although this bill was introduced
in 2004, the Senate voted on its adoption in 2006. The second sentence of the bill
was cast using the interpretational approach, but the first sentence was not. The
result of this bifurcated structure was that the bill affirmatively prohibited formal
marriage for same-sex couples, but relied on the interpretational approach for its
treatment of alternative arrangements, such as civil unions and domestic
partnerships. Obviously, it would be more respectful of LGBT relationships (if
one were to have such an amendment at all) to use the interpretational approach
for the entirety of the proposal.
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more democratic approach. In choosing the linguistic pattern that
maximizes the anti-democratic potential of their amendment, they
betray not only the extent of their animosity to the concerns of
LGBT people, but also their callousness to the workings of
113
democracy.
V. CONCLUSION
The proposed marriage discrimination amendment to the
Minnesota Constitution is profoundly anti-democratic.
It is
extremely wide-ranging in its scope, it obliterates the opportunity
of the LGBT community to legislatively advance its interests in the
area, it falsely assumes characteristics of the state judiciary that do
not in fact exist, and it is drafted with language that is particularly
hostile to LGBT concerns and democracy in general. It was a
triumph for reason and democracy that this amendment was
defeated in 2006. It should never be introduced again. In the
unfortunate event that it is introduced again, it should be
resoundingly defeated.

113. In her foregoing essay, Professor Collett complains that some pro-LGBT
commentators ascribe bigotry or homophobia to those who oppose same-sex
marriage. Collett, supra note 4, at 1052–53. It is not my purpose in this essay to
ascribe bigoted or homophobic motivations to anyone. But proponents of a
constitutional amendment against same-sex marriage should recall that they have
purposely chosen the linguistic pattern for their amendment that maximizes the
amendment’s anti-democratic effects, as indicated in the text above. This
linguistic choice, also as explained above, maximizes the restrictive effects on the
LGBT community. Proponents of this amendment in particular, drafted the way it
has been, should therefore be able to understand why some in the LGBT
community might distrust their motives, given that the amendment’s proponents
had readily available other linguistic models with more moderate effects.

